Abstract The rank of a bimatrix game is defined as the rank of the sum of the payoff matrices of the two players. Under certain conditions on the payoff matrices, we devise a method that reduces the rank of the game without changing the equilibrium of the game. We leverage matrix pencil theory and Wedderburn rank reduction formula to arrive at our results. We also present a constructive proof of the fact that in a generic square game, the rank of the game can be reduced by 1, and in generic rectangular game, the rank of the game can be reduced by 2 under certain assumptions.
Introduction
The study of game theory -the model of strategic interaction between rational agents -has a rich history dating back to the formalization of the field by John von Neumann in 1928 [26] . The concept of equivalence, in particular strategic equivalence, between game theoretic models also enjoys a rich history, dating back to at least von Neumann and Morgenstern's book first published in 1944 [27, p. 245] . We say that two games, G and G ′ , are strategically equivalent if the optimal strategies of every player in G corresponds to the optimal strategies of every player in G ′ .
1
Computing a solution in a k-player finite normal-form game G, typically referred to as a Nash equilibrium (NE), is one of the fundamental problems in game theory.
2 Due to the well known theorem by Nash in 1951, we know that every finite game has a solution, possibly in mixed strategies [21] . However, outside of some restricted classes of games, it is not clear that a NE can be efficiently computed.
In this work we focus on finite, 2-player bimatrix games in which the payoffs to the players can be represented as two matrices, A and B, and define the rank of a game as the rank of the sum of the two payoff matrices.The rank of a game is known to impact both the most suitable computation methods for determining a solution and the expressive power of the game. For example, it is well known that zero-sum games 3 , which are rank-0 games, can be solved via a linear programming approach. For approximate solutions, [17] give a computational method for rank-k games, defined as a class of games where rank(A + B) ≤ k, for some given k.
On the other hand, many operations that preserve the strategic equivalence of bimatrix games modify the rank of the game. For example, the well studied constant-sum game is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game. 4 However, the zero-sum game has rank zero, while the constant-sum game is a rank-1 game. Since the rank of a game influences both the most suitable solution techniques and the expressive nature of a game, one should be particularly interested in determining if a given game G ′ is strategically equivalent to a game G, where the rank of G is less than the rank of G ′ . In this contribution, we do just that. Given a game G ′ , we apply the classical theory of matrix pencils in conjunction with the Wedderburn rank reduction formula to determine whether or not G ′ is strategically equivalent to a game of lower rank. If so, we also show techniques for efficiently calculating the lower rank game.
Prior to discussing related research in this area, let us first proceed to outline the remainder of the paper. In the next section, we review some game theoretic concepts, introduce our notation, and proceed to define the specific form of strategic equivalence that we consider. Following that, we then formalize our problem and present the main result. Then, in Section 4, we briefly review the theory of matrix pencils and the Wedderburn rank reduction formula, and apply those results to derive a sequence of theorems and corollaries which thus prove the main result. Following that, we present some consequences of our results when applied to generic (random) games. We then proceed to compare our results to other results in the literature, discuss some additional immediate consequences of our results, and lightly touch on some algorithmic implications. Finally we wrap up the paper with a conclusion, and collect some related theorems and proofs in the appendix.
Prior Work
Many papers in the literature have explored the concept of equivalent classes of games. One such concept, which we focus on in this work, is strategic equivalence, those games that share exactly the same set of NE. Indeed, for a classical example, von Neumann and Morgenstern studied strategically equivalent n-person zero-sum games [27, p. 245] and constant-sum games [27, p. 346] .
In a recent work by Possieri and Hespanha, the authors consider the problem of designing strategically equivalent games [22] . As such, given a bimatrix game G, their problem is to design a family of games that is either weakly strategically equivalent 5 or strongly strategically equivalent 6 . Since this work falls into the category of mechanism design, it is incompatible with the work that we present here. Indeed, we consider the inverse problem-given a bimatrix game G, does there exist a strategically equivalent game of strictly lower rank?
More closely related to our work is the class of strategically zero-sum games defined by Moulin and Vial in [20] . They study the class of games in which no completely mixed NE can be improved upon via a correlation strategy and come to the conclusion that these games are the class of strategically zero-sum games. For the bimatrix case, they provide a complete characterization of strategically zero-sum games [20, Theorem 2] .
Around the same time, Isaacson and Millham studied a class of bimatrix games that they characterized as row-constant games [16] . They define row-constant games as those bimatrix games where the sum of the payoff matrices is a matrix with constant rows. In their work, they show that the NE strategies of a row-constant game can be found via solving the zero-sum game (m, n, A, −A). Comparing [16] and [20] , one can easily see that row-constant games form a subclass of strategically zero-sum games.
Closely related to strategically zero-sum bimatrix games are the class of strictly competitive games [5] . In a strictly competitive game, if both players change their mixed strategies, then either the payoffs remain unchanged, or one of the two payoffs increases while the other payoff decreases. In other words, all possible outcomes are Pareto optimal. It has long been claimed that strictly competitive games share many common and desirable NE features with zero-sum games, such as ordered interchangeability, NE payoff equivalence, and convexity of the NE set [10] . Indeed, Aumann claims that strictly competitive games are equivalent to zero-sum games [5] . However, many years later Adler et. al. conducted a literature search and found that the claim of equivalence of strictly competitive games and zero-sum games was made was often repeated, but without formal proof [1] . They then proceeded to prove that this claim does indeed hold true. Comparing the results of Adler et. al [1] to the characterization of strategically zero-sum games in [20] , one can observe that Moulin and Vial were correct in asserting that strictly competitive games form a subclass of strategically zero-sum games.
Preliminaries
In this section, we recall some basic definitions in bimatrix games and the definition of strategic equivalence in bimatrix games.
We consider here a two player game, in which player 1 (the row player) has m actions and player 2 (the column player) has n actions. Player 1's set of pure strategies is denoted by S 1 = {1, . . . , m} and player 2's set of pure strategies is S 2 = {1, . . . , n}. If the players play pure strategies (i, j) ∈ S 1 × S 2 , then player 1 receives a payoff of a ij and player 2 receives b ij .
We let A = [a ij ] ∈ R m×n represent the payoff matrix of player 1 and B = [b ij ] ∈ R m×n represent the payoff matrix of player 2. As the two-player finite game can be represented by two matrices, this game is commonly referred to as a bimatrix game. The bimatrix game is then defined by the tuple (m, n, A, B). Define the m × n matrix C as the sum of the two payoff matrices, C := A + B. We define the rank of a game as rank(C) 7 . Players may also play mixed strategies, which correspond to a probability distribution over the available set of pure strategies. Player 1 has mixed strategies p and player 2 has mixed strategies q, where p ∈ ∆m and q ∈ ∆n. Using the notation introduced above, player 1 has expected payoff p T Aq and player 2 has expected payoff p T Bq.
Strategic Equivalence in Bimatrix Games
A Nash Equilibrium is defined as a tuple of strategies (p * , q * ) such that each player's strategy is an optimal response to the other player's strategy. In other words, neither player can benefit, in expectation, by unilaterally deviating from the Nash Equilibrium. This is made precise in the following definition.
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium [21] ) We refer to the pair of strategies (p * , q * ) as a Nash Equilibrium (NE) if and only if:
It is a well known fact due to Nash [21] that every bimatrix game with finite set of pure strategies has at least one NE in mixed strategies. However, one can define games in which multiple NE exist in mixed strategies. Let Φ : R m×n × R m×n ⇒ ∆m × ∆n be the Nash equilibrium correspondence 8 : Given the matrices (A, B), Φ(A, B) ⊂ ∆m × ∆n denotes the set of all Nash equilibria of the game 7 Some authors define the rank of the game to be the maximum of the rank of the two matrices A and B, but this is not the case here.
8 A correspondence is a set valued map [4, p. 555] .
(m, n, A, B). Note that due to the result in [21] , Φ(A, B) is nonempty for every (A, B) ∈ R m×n × R m×n . We say that two games are strategically equivalent if both games have the same set of players, the same set of strategies per player, and the same set of Nash equilibria. The following definition formalizes this concept. We now have a well known Lemma on strategic equivalence in bimatrix games that is typically stated without proof. 9 As we were unable to find a proof in the literature, we state the relatively simple proof here. Proof Since p ∈ ∆m and q ∈ ∆m, we have p T 1m = 1 and 1
Now, assume that (p * , q * ) is an NE of (m, n,Ã,B). Then, for player 1,
Similarly, for player 2,
Then Definition 2 is satisfied, and (p * , q * ) is an NE of (m, n, A, B) if and only if (p * , q * ) is an NE of (m, n,Ã,B).
⊓ ⊔ 3 Problem Formulation and Main Result
The positive affine transformation (PAT) that we have presented in Lemma 1 has been well studied for the forward direction case. In those situations, one calculates the Nash equilibria of the game (m, n, A, B). Then, by choosing suitable parameters (α i , β i , u, v), one can design a family of games (m, n,Ã,B) that share the same set of NE as (m, n, A, B), but with a different payoff structure.
Here, we consider the inverse problem. Given a game (m, n,Ã,B), is it possible to determine parameters (α i , β i , u, v), such that (m, n,Ã,B) is strategically equivalent to (m, n, A, B) via a PAT? This is particularly interesting when the game (m, n, A, B) is a low rank game and (m, n,Ã,B) is a game of higher rank. In other words, rank(A + B) = k and rank(Ã +B) =k, withk > k.
Low rank games are an interesting class of games to study, as the rank of a game is known to impact both the most suitable computation methods for determining a solution and the expressive power of the game. For example, it is well known that zero-sum games, where k = 0, can be solved via a linear programming approach. In addition, recent work has shown computationally efficient algorithms for finding one NE [2] or all NE [2, 23] of rank-1 games. For approximate NE, [17] give a computational method for rank-k games, defined as a class of games where rank(A + B) ≤ k, for some given k.
As for the expressive power of a game, we consider the maximum number of NE that a game may have. For nondegenerate 10 zero-sum games, it is well-known that there is only one possible NE. As for the expressive power of rank-k games, with k > 0, the maximal number of NE is an open question. However, lower bounds, even for rank-1, are significantly higher than the zero-sum case; see, for example, [17, Corollary 3.1] and [3] .
With the motivation for determining the true rank (whether the game is strategically equivalent to a game of lower rank) established above, we now turn our attention to analyzing the mathematical properties of the positive affine transformation.
From Lemma 1, we conclude that if there exists
n , and v ∈ R m such that:
then (m, n,Ã,B) is strategically equivalent to the rank-k game (m, n, A,
) via a positive affine transformation (PAT). Combining (1) and (2), we have:
Defining γ := α1 α2 ,û := β 1 u,v := γβ 2 v, and letting α 1 r i c
Thus, what we have shown above is the following result:
10 For a concise discussion of (non)degeneracy, see [28, Section 2.6] Proof The proof follows from the preceding discussions.
⊓ ⊔
In what follows, we show the converse holds. Furthermore, in Section 4, we show constructive methods for obtaining a game of lower rank that is strategically equivalent to the original game.
Assumption 2 The game (m, n,Ã,B) satisfies 1. There exists a γ * ∈ R >0 such that rank(Ã + γ * B ) =k < rank(Ã +B) 2. There existsû,r i = 0n andv,ĉ i = 0m such thatÃ + γ * B can be decomposed intõ
Theorem 3 If Assumption 2 holds, then there exists a matrixÂ ∈ R m×n and vectorŝ
Proof The result is an immediate consequence of Theorem 10, which we state and prove in Section 4.
⊓ ⊔
In Section 4, we prove Theorem 10 and, consequently, Theorem 3 above, through a series of intermediate theorems and corollaries. We will show the necessary conditions under which Assumption 2 holds true and devise methods to test those conditions. In addition, we will show that if either condition of Assumption 2 hold true, it is possible to reduce the rank of the game (m, n,Ã,B) to some degree, although that reduction isn't as high as the reduction that one obtains when both conditions hold true.
We can therefore decompose our problem into two parts based on Assumption 2, and a third part based on constructing the strategically equivalent lower-rank game (m, n,Â,B). Those three parts are:
1. Given (m, n,Ã,B), determine whether or not there exists γ * ∈ R >0 such that rank(Ã + γ * B ) < rank(Ã +B). If there does not exist any γ * satisfying this condition, then set γ
3. FromÃ + γ * B determined above, construct the strategically equivalent rank-k game (m, n,Â,B)
In the sequel, we will show that part 1 of the problem is closely connected to the matrix pencil problem. We will then proceed to show that parts 2 and 3 can be efficiently solved by applying the classical Wedderburn rank reduction formula.
Proof of The Main Result
In this section, we introduce matrix pencils, discuss an existing canonical form for calculating the eigenvalues of rectangular pencils, and show how such a canonical form can be applied to obtain a bimatrix game of lower rank than the original game. Following that, we will discuss the Wedderburn rank reduction formula and apply that to further reduce the rank of a game. Finally, we conclude the section with the statement and proof of our main result.
Matrix Pencils
Let A, B ∈ R m×n be matrices of known values, and let λ represent an unknown parameter.
11 Then the set of all matrices of the form A + λB, with λ ∈ C, define a linear matrix pencil (or just a pencil ) [11, p. 24] , [15] .
12
While not as well studied as the standard eigenproblem, A − λI, the theory of pencils still enjoys a rich history. For the square, nonsingular, m × m case, Weierstrass investigated pencils and developed a canonical form as early as 1867. The rectangular case was later solved, with a canonical form presented, by Kronecker in 1890. His canonical form, aptly named the Kronecker Canonical Form (KCF), was popularized by Gantmacher in chapter XII of his two volume treatise on the theory of matrices [11, Ch. 12] . For a (not so short) survey on pencils, we refer the reader to [15] . For a discussion of the various canonical forms and computational methods, for the square case see [12, Ch. 7.7] , and for the more general singular/rectangular case, see [8] .
In a series of papers, [30, 25] , the authors study the relationship between the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of matrix pencils and the solution of a zero-sum game, where the game is formulated as (m, n, A−λB, −A+λB). 13 Their results are indeed theoretically interesting; however, as the author states in [30] , the relationship between eigensystems and game theory is "tenuous". This seems to make, at least in accordance with the current theoretical results, the study of eigensystems illsuited as a solution concept for bimatrix games. In contrast, as we will show in this subsection, the matrix pencil problem is well-suited to the study of strategically equivalent games.
In the remainder of this section, we review the canonical form of a matrix pencil presented by Thompson and Weil in [24, 25] . Although not a common terminology in the literature, we'll refer to this canonical form as the Thompson-Weil Canonical Form (TWCF). Our motivation for studying the TWCF is two-fold. First off, the TWCF focuses on only computing those eigenvalues, if they exist, that strictly reduce the rank of the pencil A + λB. Other extraneous values, such as those computed in the KCF, are ignored. Secondly, we wish to bring renewed emphasis on existing results that connect the study of matrix pencils to game theory.
For completeness, we now restate some results from [24, 25, 7] . Following that, we show how to apply those results to calculate an equivalent game of lower rank.
Let rank(A)=p and rank(B)=r.
Definition 3 ([25, Definition 2.1]) By a solution to the pencil A + λB, we shall mean a triple (λ, x, y) ∈ C × R n × R m , satisfying x = 0 and y = 0, that solve the 11 In general, the theory of matrix pencils is defined over a field F. In a our game-theoretic context, we restrict this field to the field of real numbers. 12 The literature defines both the set of matrices A + λB and A − λB as pencils. Although A−λB seems to be more common (possibly due to the connection to the standard presentation of the eigenvalue problem A − λI), we choose to use A + λB as it more closely aligns with the problem presented in Section 3. 13 The square, traditional eigenvalue problem with (m, m, A − λI, −A + λI) is studied in [30] . The authors present the rectangular matrix pencil version in [25] .
set of equations
and have the property that rank((A + λB)) < rank((A + µB)) for any µ that is not an element of the solution triple.
Throughout their series of works on matrix pencils, the authors of [24, 25, 7] refer to the solution triple in Definition 3 by various names such as pencil value, pencil roots, rank-reducing numbers, left pencil-vector, and right pencil-vector. For simplicity, we choose to use the terms eigenvalue and left\right eigenvector. We will also use the set λ (A, B) to represent all λ that are in the solution triple as defined in Definition 3. 
where q ≤ min{m − r, n − r, p}, E 12 is in column echelon form, rank(E 12 ) = t, E 21 is in row echelon form, and rank(E 21 ) = s. Any of s, t, q may be zero, r + s + q ≤ m, and r + t + q ≤ n.
Proof See Lemma 1 of [24] or Theorem 2.1 of [25] . 
Proof See Lemma 2 of [24] .
Furthermore, by repeated applications of Lemmas 2 and 3, the authors define an iterative algorithm that solves for the set λ(A, B), including identifying if λ(A, B) = ∅. We briefly outline the algorithm in Algorithm 1. For the full proof and implementation details, we refer the reader to [24, 7] .
Remark 1 As the authors note in [7] , their algorithm may be numerically unsound for ill-conditioned problems. Indeed, while there does not appear to be any results in the literature comparing the numerical stability of the TWCF algorithm and Gantmacher's method for computing the KCF, it seems likely that both methods may share similar numerical difficulties. Therefore, other algorithms may be better suited for ill-conditioned problems. For the square, dense matrix pencil, (whether ill-conditioned or not) the famous QZ algorithm of Moler and Stewart is likely a better option [19] , [12, Ch. 7.7] . For the rectangular case, numerical accuracy for ill-conditioned problems can likely be improved via the GUTPRI algorithm [8] . However, even in light of this discussion, we choose to explore the TWCF as it provides insight into the mathematical structure of the pencil that applies to our problem at hand. We now state one final definition before proceeding to state the main theorem from [24] , which we use to prove our first main result. Proof See [24] .
As we are only concerned with the real, strictly positive eigenvalues, let us further define the restricted set of eigenvalues as: Proof Clearly, if λ >0 (Ã,B) = ∅, then for all λ ∈ R >0 we have rank(A + λB) = r + q by Theorem 4. As our goal is to identify games of strictly lower rank, let us then suppose that λ >0 (Ã,B) = ∅. Furthermore, suppose m(γ * ) > m(1). Then, by Theorem 4, we have that:
Since, by definition,Ã + γ * B =Ā +B, we have that rank(Ã + γ * B ) =k = rank(Ā +B). Therefore, the game (m, n,Ā,B) is a rank-k game. Finally, by Lemma 1, the game (m, n,Ã,B) is strategically equivalent to (m, n,Ā,B) with β 1 = β 2 = 0,
Further Reduction via the Wedderburn Rank Reduction Formula
In this subsection, we show that if Theorem 5 identifies a reduction to an equivalent game of lower rank, then it may be possible to reduce the rank even further. In contrast, if Theorem 5 does not identify a game of lower rank, if certain conditions hold we may still be able to reduce the rank of the game (by at most 2 in both cases). In what follows, we first present the Wedderburn Rank Reduction formula upon which our technique is based, and then we proceed to state and prove our next two results. The Wedderburn Rank Reduction formula is a classical technique in linear algebra that allows one to reduce the rank of a matrix by subtracting a specifically formulated rank-1 matrix. By repeated applications of the formula, one can obtain a matrix decomposition as the sum of multiple rank-1 matrices. In contrast to other well-known matrix factorization algorithms, such as singular value decomposition, the Wedderburn rank reduction formula allows almost limitless flexibility in choosing the basis of the rank-1 matrices that are subtracted at each iteration. For further reading on the Wedderburn rank reduction formula, we refer the reader to Wedderburn's original book [29, p. 69 ], or to the excellent treatment of the topic by Chu et al. [6] .
We now proceed to state Wedderburn's original theorem. Following that, we show how one can exploit the flexibility of the decomposition to extract specifically formulated rank-1 matrices that allow us, when certain conditions hold true, to further reduce the rank of a bimatrix game. 
has rank exactly one less than the rank of C.
Proof The original proof of (7) is due to Wedderburn [29, p. 69] . See Appendix A for our restated version.
⊓ ⊔
Consider again the game (m, n,Ã,B) upon which one has applied Theorem 5. Here we use the same notation as in Theorem 5. If Theorem 5 has identified a γ * such thatk <k, let (m, n,Ā,B) be as defined in Theorem 5. Otherwise, letĀ =Ã andB =B. We now apply the following series of theorems and corollaries to this game (m, n,Ā,B).
Theorem 7
Consider the game (m, n,Ā,B) with n ≥ m ≥ 2,C =Ā +B, and rank(C) =k ≥ 1. If 1m ∈ ColSpan(C) (8) then there exists x 1 ∈ R n and y 1 ∈ R m such thatCx 1 = 1m and w 1 = y
and computeC 2 using (7) as follows:
DefineÂ =Ā−1mû T andB =B. Then the bimatrix game (m, n,Ā,B) is strategically equivalent to the rank-(k − 1) game (m, n,Â,B).
Before stating the proof of Theorem 7, we first state an auxiliary lemma that we invoke in the proof. 
Proof The proof is straightforward and therefore omitted.
⊓ ⊔

Proof (Proof of Theorem 7)
Suppose (8) holds true, then there exists x 1 ∈ R n such thatCx 1 = 1m. In addition, rank(C) ≥ 1 implies thatC = 0 m×n . Then applying Lemma 4 shows the existence of y 1 such that w 1 = y T 1C x 1 = 0. With w 1 andû therefore well-defined, apply (7) to obtainC 2 as in the statement of the theorem. By Theorem 6,C 2 is a matrix of rank-(k − 1). WithÂ =Ā − 1mû
T andB =B we have that:Â +B =Ā +B − 1mû
Then the game (m, n,Â,B) is strategically equivalent to (m, n,Ā,B) by Lemma 1 and has rank (k − 1). 
∃x ∈ x ∈ R n |Cx = 1m, 1
T n x = 0 (10)
then there exists x 1 , x 2 ∈ R n and y 1 , y 2 ∈ R m such that:
, and computeC 2 using (7) as follows:
2C 2 x 2 and computeC 3 using (7) as follows:C
T , where
, and the bimatrix game (m, n,Ā,B) is strategically equivalent to the rank-(k − 2) game (m, n,Â,B).
Before stating the proof of Theorem 8, we first state proposition that is necessary for the proof. Motivated by [6, Theorem 2.1], we have the following proposition that gives conditions for when a chosen vector is in the row span of a matrix C 2 , obtained after one application of (7). 
After applying the Wedderburn rank reduction formula, we havē
We now proceed to show that there exists y 2 such that y 2C2 = 1 T n . By assumption (9), we have that 1n ∈ ColSpan(C T ). Also, by assumption 10, we have that 1
T n x 1 = 0. Then, by Proposition 9, 1n ∈ ColSpan(C T ) and 1
T n x 1 = 0 implies that 1n ∈ ColSpan(C T 2 ). Therefore, there exists y 2 such that y
Let us now show the existence of x 2 such that w 2 = 0. By Theorem 6 and the assumption that rank(C) ≥ 2, we have that rank(C 2 ) ≥ 1, which implies that C 2 = 0 m×n . Therefore, by Lemma 4 there exists x 2 such thatC 2 x 2 = 0m and
Again, we apply the Wedderburn rank reduction formula to obtain
The assumption that rank(C) =k and Theorem 13 implies that rank(C 3 ) = k − 2.
Finally, definingÂ :=Ā − 1mû
Therefore, (m, n,Ā,B) is strategically equivalent to (m, n,Â,B) by Lemma 1 andÂ +B =C 3 , which is a rank-(k − 2) game.
⊓ ⊔
Remark 2 Conditions such as (10) in Theorem 8 can be easily verified, for example by:
Solving for x 1 in Theorems 7 and 8 is simply the solution of a linear equation, Cx 1 = 1m, which is efficiently computable via a variety of methods. 15 As for determining y 1 in Theorem 7, one can select y 1 exactly as shown in Lemma 4. Alternatively, one could select any random y 1 such that y 1 / ∈ null(C T ) and y Therefore, what we've shown in Remark 2, is that Theorems 7 and 8 are indeed constructive, and allow us to efficiently compute the strategically equivalent lower rank game (m, n,Â,B).
Finally, we now state our main result by combining the results of Theorems 5, 7, and 8. 
Some Results on Rank Reduction in Generic Games
In this section, we collect some natural consequences of Proposition 9 for reducing the rank of generic games. Recall that a game is determined by the matrices (A, B) ∈ R 2×(m×n) . Thus, one can view R 2×(m×n) as the space of all games. If one picks a generic game from this space, it is natural to ask whether or not the rank of the game can be reduced and by how much.
It turns out that Proposition 9 allows us to conclude the following two results. In the first result, we focus on generic games in which m = n. It should be noted that the set of generic games in the space R 2×(m×m) with full rank has full measure. We conclude that for such games, we can reduce the rank only by 1. In the second result, we consider the case where m < n. Proof In order to prove the result, we show that the set of games whose rank can be reduced by two has Lebesgue measure 0. Note that by Proposition 9, we can reduce the rank of the game by 2 if there exists x 1 satisfying 1 T m x 1 = 0 and Cx 1 = 1m. Since C is full rank, there exists a unique x 1 satisfying Cx 1 = 1m, which is given by x 1 = C −1 1m. Thus, the rank of the game can be reduced by 2 if and only if 1 T m C −1 1m = 0. This holds if the cofactors of the matrix C sum to zero. The sum of cofactors is a multivariate polynomial of degree m − 1, and thus, the set of points where this polynomial equals 0 is an (m − 1) dimensional manifold in a m 2 dimensional space. Consequently, the set of all C ∈ R m×m whose cofactors sum to zero has Lebesgue measure 0.
⊓ ⊔
In contrast to the case considered above, we restrict attention to games in which 2 < m < n, rank of the sum C of payoff matrices is k ≤ m, and 1m ∈ ColSpan(C), 1n ∈ ColSpan(C T ) is satisfied. This class of games forms a submanifold in
We show that for almost every game on this submanifold, the rank can be reduced by 2.
Proposition 12 For almost every (random) game (m, n, A, B) such that 3 < m < n, rank(C) = k ≤ m, and 1m ∈ ColSpan(C), 1n ∈ ColSpan(C T ), the rank of the game can be reduced by 2.
Proof Let x 1 be such that Cx 1 = 1m. Split the matrix C and x 1 as
where C 11 is a k ×k full rank submatrix, x 11 is a k ×1 vector, and x 12 is a (n−k)×1 vector. Note that due to our assumption, n − k ≥ 1. We note here that if k = m, then C 21 and C 22 may be empty matrices. Now, due to Proposition ..., we can reduce the rank of the game by 2 if there exists x 1 satisfying 1 T n x 1 = 0 and Cx 1 = 1m. Thus, Cx 1 = 1m implies
Similarly, 1
Substituting the value of x 11 from above, we get
Rearranging the equation yields
The left side of the equation is non zero for almost every matrix C 11 . The right side can be nonzero for an appropriate choice of x 12 if and only if C
thus, this set has Lebesgue measure 0. The proof of the statement is complete.
⊓ ⊔ 6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss some immediate consequences of our results from Section 4, compare our results to a similar result in the literature, and briefly touch on some algorithmic implications.
First-off, an immediate consequence of Corollary 72 that we show in [13] is that all 2×n games are strategically equivalent to another game that is at most a rank-1 game. In that work, we give an algorithm for determining such an equivalent game in polynomial time. Combined with the polynomial time rank-1 algorithm of [2] , this provides an alternative polynomial time algorithm to the well-known support enumeration algorithm [9] for solving 2 × n games. Our result in Corollary 72 generalizes Lemma 5 to game (m, n, A, B), with m ≤ n and rank(A + B) = m. In addition, Theorems 7 and 8 further generalizes the result to hold for certain games that are not full rank. Furthermore, while the statement and proof of Lemma 5 shows the existence of such a lower-rank equivalent game, our results are constructive and provide a method for calculating the lower-rank equivalent game.
In order to focus this work on the mathematical theory of rank reduction in bimatrix games, we've purposely avoided discussing algorithmic implications throughout the previous sections. Here, we briefly note that our results readily lead to efficiently implementable algorithms. For example, in our submitted work [14] , we show an alternative method for calculating γ * when (m, n,Ã,B) is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum (rank-0) game. That method, along with some algorithmic tweaks to Theorems 7 and 8, leads to an algorithm that can determine whether or not a given game is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game via a PAT. If so, the algorithm also returns the strategically equivalent zero-sum game (m, n,Â, −Â). Furthermore, we show that determining γ * and (m, n,Â, −Â) can both be done in linear time (O(mn)).
For rank-1 games, we've also developed an algorithm based on results similar to Theorems 5, 7, and 8 that can determine whether a given game, (m, n,Ã,B), is strategically equivalent to a rank-1 game and, if so, return the equivalent rank-1 game (m, n,Â,B) in linear time (O(mn)). However, the modified versions of the results and the ensuing algorithms require many carefully constructed technical details. As such, we've chosen to report those results in another work in order to avoid unnecessarily obscuring the more general results that we've reported on in this work.
Conclusion
Non-zero sum games have been shown to be computationally challenging to solve. In this paper, we present an alternative approach to computing equilibrium in a certain class of non-zero-sum games. Given a non-zero-sum game, our approach exploits the strategic equivalence between bimatrix games to construct a lower rank bimatrix game that is strategically equivalent to the original game via a positive affine transformation. Moreover, our technique is constructive, that is, we can derive an algorithm to reduce the rank of the given game.
Our approach has the potential to reduce the rank of the game substantially in some cases. If the original game can be reduced to a rank 0 (also known as zero-sum game) or a rank 1 game, then we know that it can be solved efficiently using algorithms involving linear programs or parametrized linear programs, respectively.
A Wedderburn Rank Reduction Formula and Some Consequences
In this section, we collect proofs and other results that were omitted from the main body.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 6)
The original proof of (7) is due to Wedderburn [29, p. 69] . We restate it here for completeness.
We first show that the null space of C 2 contains the null space of C 1 . Pick z such that C 1 z = 0. Then, C 2 z = C 1 z − w −1 1 C 1 x 1 y T 1 C 1 z = 0. Thus, z is in the null space of C 2 , which implies that the null space of C 2 contains the null space of C 1 .
Next, we show that x 1 is in the null space of C 2 , thereby showing that the dimension of the null space of C 2 is one more than dimension of the null space of C 1 (since C 1 x 1 = 0).
Thus, the rank of C 2 is one less than the rank of C 1 .
⊓ ⊔
We now have the following theorem that applies the Wedderburn rank reduction formula to compute a decomposition of the matrix. While not explicitly invoked in our presentation, we discuss the theorem in Subsection 4.2 and do use a truncated version of the theorem in Theorem 8 that terminates after two iterations. Therefore, we include the theorem for completeness.
Theorem 13 (Rank-Reducing Process [29, p . 69] [6] ) Let C ∈ R m×n . If rank(C) = r, then there exists x k ∈ R n , y k ∈ R m , k = 1, . . . , r such that w k = y T k C k x k = 0 and the following holds:
where C 1 = C, C γ+1 = 0, and rank(C k+1 ) = rank(C k )−1. In addition, define rank 1 matrices
Proof Apply Theorem 6 to C for r + 1 iterations. ⊓ ⊔
B Proof of Proposition 9
Proof Suppose that z ∈ ColSpan(C T 2 ). Then there exists a y 2 ∈ R m such that C T 2 y 2 = z. Choose such a y 2 and define v 2 as
Directly from Theorem 6, we have
Then by (15) , z = C T v 2 which implies that z ∈ ColSpan(C T ). From the proof of Theorem 6, it is clear that x 1 ∈ null(C 2 ). Then
Finally, with z T = v T 2 C we have that z ⊥ x 1 by (16). Now, suppose that z ∈ ColSpan(C T ) and z ⊥ x 1 . Since rank(C) ≥ 2, the ColSpan(C T ) is at least a two dimensional subspace, and thus there exists a y 1 ∈ R m such that C T y 1 and z are linearly independent. Choose such a y 1 . Choose such a y 1 . Then, y T 1 Cx 1 = 0 and v 2 , as given in (14) , is well-defined. Select y 2 such that C T y 2 = z. Then,
By (15) and (17) , we then have:
Therefore, z ∈ ColSpan(C T 2 ). ⊓ ⊔
